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We investigate the quantization of non-zero sum games. For the particular case of the Prisoners’
Dilemma we show that this game ceases to pose a dilemma if quantum strategies are allowed for.
We also construct a particular quantum strategy which always gives reward if played against any
classical strategy.
PACS-numbers: 03.67.-a, 03.65.Bz, 02.50.Le
One might wonder what games and physics could have
possibly in common. After all, games like chess or poker
seem to heavily rely on bluffing, guessing and other ac-
tivities of unphysical character. Yet, as was shown by
von Neumann and Morgenstern [1], conscious choice is
not essential for a theory of games. At the most ab-
stract level, game theory is about numbers that entities
are efficiently acting to maximize or minimize [2]. For a
quantum physicist it is then legitimate to ask what hap-
pens if linear superpositions of these actions are allowed
for, that is if games are generalized into the quantum
domain.
There are several reasons why quantizing games may
be interesting. First, classical game theory is a well
established discipline of applied mathematics [2] which
has found numerous applications in economy, psychology,
ecology and biology [2,3]. Since it is based on probabil-
ity to a large extend, there is a fundamental interest in
generalizing this theory to the domain of quantum prob-
abilities. Second, if the “Selfish Genes” [3] are reality, we
may speculate that games of survival are being played al-
ready on the molecular level where quantum mechanics
dictates the rules. Third, there is an intimate connection
between the theory of games and the theory of quan-
tum communication. Indeed, whenever a player passes
his decision to the other player or the game’s arbiter,
he in fact communicates information, which – as we live
in a quantum world – is legitimate to think of as quan-
tum information. On the other hand it has recently been
transpired that eavesdropping in quantum-channel com-
munication [4–6] and optimal cloning [7] can readily be
conceived a strategic game between two or more play-
ers, the objective being to obtain as much information as
possible in a given set-up. Finally, quantum mechanics
may well be useful to win some specially designed zero-
sum unfair games, like PQ penny flip, as was recently
demonstrated by Meyer [8], and it may assure fairness in
remote gambling [9].
In this letter we consider non-zero sum games where
– in contrast to zero-sum games – the two players no
longer appear in strict opposition to each other, but
may rather benefit from mutual cooperation. A par-
ticular instance of this class of games, which has found
widespread applications in many areas of science, is the
Prisoners’ Dilemma. In the Prisoners’ Dilemma, each of
the two players, Alice and Bob, must independently de-
cide whether she or he chooses to defect (strategy D)
or cooperate (strategy C). Depending on their decision
taken, each player receives a certain pay-off – see Tab.
I. The objective of each player is to maximize his or
her individual pay-off. The catch of the dilemma is that
D is the dominant strategy, that is, rational reasoning
forces each player to defect, and thereby doing substan-
tially worse than if they would both decide to cooperate
[10]. In terms of game theory, mutual defection is also a
Nash equilibrium [2]: in contemplating on the move DD
in retrospect, each of the players comes to the conclusion
that he or she could not have done better by unilaterally
changing his or her own strategy [11].
In this paper we give a physical model of the Pris-
oners’ Dilemma, and we show that – in the context of
this model – the players escape the dilemma if they both
resort to quantum strategies. Moreover, we shall demon-
strate that (i) there exists a particular pair of quantum
strategies which always gives reward and is a Nash equi-
librium and (ii) there exist a particular quantum strategy
which always gives at least reward if played against any
classical strategy.
The physical model consists of (i) a source of two bits,
one bit for each player, (ii) a set of physical instruments
which enable the player to manipulate his or her own bit
in a strategic manner, and (iii) a physical measurement
device which determines the players’ pay-off from the
state of the two bits. All three ingredients, the source, the
players’ physical instruments, and the pay-off physical
measurement device are assumed to be perfectly known
to both players.
TABLE I. Pay-off matrix for the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The
first entry in the parenthesis denotes the pay-off of Alice and
the second number is Bob’s pay-off. The numerical values
are chosen as in [3]. Referring to Eq. (2) this choice corre-
sponds to r = 3 (“reward”), p = 1 (“punishment”), t = 5
(“temptation”), and s = 0 (“sucker’s pay-off ”).
Bob: C Bob: D
Alice: C (3,3) (0,5)
Alice: D (5,0) (1,1)
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The quantum formulation proceeds by assigning the
possible outcomes of the classical strategies D and C two
basis vectors |D〉 and |C〉 in the Hilbert space of a two-
state system, i.e., a qubit. At each instance, the state of
the game is described by a vector in the tensor product
space which is spanned by the classical game basis |CC〉,
|CD〉, |DC〉 and |DD〉, where the first and second entry
refer to Alice’s and Bob’s qubit, respectively.
The board of our quantum-game is depicted in Fig. 1;
it can in fact be considered a simple quantum network
[12] with sources, reversible one-bit and two-bit gates and
sinks. Note that the complexity is minimal in this im-
plementation as the players’ decisions are encoded in di-
chotomic variables.
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FIG. 1. The setup of a two player quantum game.
We denote the game’s initial state by |ψ0〉 = Jˆ |CC〉 ,
where Jˆ is a unitary operator which is known to both
players. For fair games Jˆ must be symmetric with re-
spect to the interchange of the two players. The strate-
gies are executed on the distributed pair of qubits in the
state |ψ0〉. Strategic moves of Alice and Bob are asso-
ciated with unitary operators UˆA and UˆB, respectively,
which are chosen from a strategic space S. The inde-
pendence of the players dictates that UˆA and UˆB operate
exclusively on the qubits in Alice’s and Bob’s posses-
sion, respectively. The strategic space S may therefore
be identified with some subset of the group of unitary
2× 2 matrices.
Having executed their moves, which leaves the game
in a state (UˆA⊗ UˆB)Jˆ |CC〉, Alice and Bob forward their
qubits for the final measurement which determines their
pay-off. The measurement device consists of a reversible
two-bit gate J˜ which is followed by a pair of Stern Ger-
lach type detectors. The two channels of each detector
are labeled by σ = C,D. With the proviso of subsequent
justification we set J˜ = Jˆ †, such that the final state
|ψf 〉 = |ψf (UˆA, UˆB)〉 of the game prior to detection is
given by
|ψf 〉 = Jˆ †
(
UˆA ⊗ UˆB
)
Jˆ |CC〉 . (1)
The subsequent detection yields a particular result,
σσ′ = CD say, and the pay-off is returned according
to the corresponding entry of the pay-off matrix. Yet
quantum mechanics being a fundamentally probabilistic
theory, the only strategic notion of a pay-off is the ex-
pected pay-off. Alice’s expected pay-off is given by
$A = rPCC + pPDD + tPDC + sPCD , (2)
where Pσσ′ = |〈σσ′|ψf 〉|2 is the joint probability that the
channels σ and σ′ of the Stern-Gerlach type devices will
click. Bob’s expected pay-off is obtained by interchang-
ing t↔ s in the last two entries (for numerical values of
r, p, t, s see Tab. I). Note that Alice’s expected pay-off
$A not only depends on her choice of strategy UˆA, but
also on Bob’s choice UˆB.
It proves to be sufficient to restrict the strategic space
to the 2-parameter set of unitary 2× 2 matrices
Uˆ(θ, φ) =
(
eiφ cos θ/2 sin θ/2
− sin θ/2 e−iφ cos θ/2
)
(3)
with 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi and 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi/2. To be specific, we
associate the strategy “cooperate” with the operator
Cˆ ≡ Uˆ(0, 0), Cˆ =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, (4)
while the strategy “defect” is associated with a spin-flip,
Dˆ ≡ Uˆ(pi, 0), Dˆ =
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (5)
In order to guarantee that the ordinary Prisoners’
Dilemma is faithfully represented, we impose the sub-
sidiary conditions
[Jˆ , Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ] = 0 , [Jˆ , Dˆ ⊗ Cˆ] = 0 , [Jˆ , Cˆ ⊗ Dˆ] = 0 . (6)
These conditions together with the identification J˜ = Jˆ †
imply that for any pair of strategies taken from the sub-
set S0 ≡ {Uˆ(θ, 0)| θ ∈ [0, pi]}, the joint probabilities Pσσ′
factorize, Pσσ′ = p
(σ)
A p
(σ′)
B , where p
(C) = cos2(θ/2) and
p(D) = 1 − p(C). Identifying p(C) with the individual
preference to cooperate, we observe that condition (6)
in fact assures that the quantum Prisoners’ Dilemma en-
tails a faithful representation of the most general classical
Prisoners’ Dilemma, where each player uses a biased coin
in order to decide whether he or she chooses to cooper-
ate or to defect [13]. Of course, the entire set of quantum
strategies is much bigger than S0, and it is the quantum
sector S\S0 which offers additional degrees of freedom
that can be exploited for strategic purposes. Note that
our quantization scheme applies to any two player bi-
nary choice symmetric game and – due to the classical
correspondence principle Eq. (6) – is to a great extent
canonical.
Factoring out Abelian subgroups which yield nothing
but a reparametrization of the quantum sector of the
strategic space S, a solution of Eq. (6) is given by
Jˆ = exp{iγDˆ⊗ Dˆ/2} , (7)
where γ ∈ [0, pi/2] is a real parameter. In fact, γ is a mea-
sure for the game’s entanglement. For a separable game
γ = 0, and the joint probabilities Pσσ′ factorize for all
possible pairs of strategies UˆA, UˆB. Fig. 2 shows Alice’s
expected pay-off for γ = 0. As can be seen in this figure,
for any of Bob’s choices UˆB Alice’s pay-off is maximized
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if she chooses to play Dˆ. The game being symmetric, the
same holds for Bob and Dˆ⊗Dˆ is the equilibrium in dom-
inant strategies. Indeed, separable games do not display
any features which go beyond the classical game.
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FIG. 2. Alice’s pay-off in a separable game. In this and
the following plot we have chosen a certain parametrization
such that the strategies UˆA and UˆB each depend on a single
parameter t ∈ [−1, 1] only: we set UˆA = Uˆ(tpi, 0) for t ∈ [0, 1]
and UˆA = Uˆ(0,−tpi/2) for t ∈ [−1, 0) (same for Bob). De-
fection Dˆ corresponds to the value t = 1, cooperation Cˆ to
t = 0, and Qˆ is represented by t = −1.
The situation is entirely different for a maximally en-
tangled game γ = pi/2. Here, pairs of strategies exist
which have no counterpart in the classical domain, yet
by virtue of Eq. (6) the game behaves completely clas-
sical if both players decide to play φ = 0. For example,
PCC = | cos(φA+φB) cos(θA/2) cos(θB/2)|2 factorizes on
S0 ⊗ S0 (i.e., φA = φB = 0 fixed), but exhibits non-local
correlations otherwise. In Fig. 3 we depict Alice’s pay-off
in the Prisoners’ Dilemma as a function of the strategies
UˆA, UˆB. Assuming Bob chooses Dˆ, Alice’s best reply
would be
Qˆ ≡ Uˆ(0, pi/2), Qˆ =
(
i 0
0 −i
)
, (8)
while assuming Bob plays Cˆ Alice’s best strategy would
be defection Dˆ. Thus, there is no dominant strategy left
for Alice. The game being symmetric, the same holds for
Bob, i.e., Dˆ⊗ Dˆ is no longer an equilibrium in dominant
strategies.
Surprisingly, Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ even ceases to be a Nash equi-
librium as both players can improve by unilaterally de-
viating from the strategy Dˆ. However, concomitant
with the disappearance of the equilibrium Dˆ ⊗ Dˆ a
new Nash equilibrium Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ has emerged with pay-off
$A(Qˆ, Qˆ) = $B(Qˆ, Qˆ) = 3. Indeed, $A(Uˆ(θ, φ), Qˆ) =
cos2(θ/2)
(
3 sin2 φ+ cos2 φ
) ≤ 3 for all θ ∈ [0, pi] and
φ ∈ [0, pi/2] and analogously $B(Qˆ, UˆB) ≤ $B(Qˆ, Qˆ) for
all UˆB ∈ S such that no player can gain from unilaterally
deviating from Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ. It can be shown that Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ is
a unique equilibrium, that is, rational reasoning dictates
both players to play Qˆ as their optimal strategy.
It is interesting to see that Qˆ ⊗ Qˆ has the property
to be Pareto optimal [2], that is, by deviating from this
pair of strategies it is not possible to increase the pay-off
of one player without lessening the pay-off of the other
player. In the classical game only mutual cooperation
is Pareto optimal, but it is not an equilibrium solution.
One could say that by allowing for quantum strategies
the players escape the dilemma [14].
The alert reader may object that – very much like any
quantum mechanical system can be simulated on a clas-
sical computer – the quantum game proposed here can
be played by purely classical means. For instance, Alice
and Bob each may communicate their choice of angles
to the judge using ordinary telephone lines. The judge
computes the values Pσσ′ , tosses a four-sided coin which
is biased on these values, and returns the pay-off accord-
ing to the outcome of the experiment. While such an
implementation yields the proper pay-off in this scenario
four real numbers have to be transmitted. This contrasts
most dramatically with our quantum mechanical model
which is more economical as far as communication re-
sources are concerned. Moreover, any local hidden vari-
able model of the physical scheme presented here predicts
inequalities for Pσσ′ , as functions of the four angles θA,
θB, φA, and φB , which are violated by the above ex-
pressions for the expected pay-off. We conclude that in
an environment with limited resources, it is only quan-
tum mechanics which allows for an implementation of the
game presented here.
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FIG. 3. Alice’s pay-off for a maximally entangled game.
The parametrization is chosen as in Fig. 2 .
So far we have considered fair games where both play-
ers had access to a common strategic space. What hap-
pens when we introduce an unfair situation: Alice may
use a quantum strategy, i.e., her strategic space is still
S, while Bob is restricted to apply only “classical strate-
gies” characterized by φB = 0? In this case Alice is well
advised to play
Mˆ = Uˆ(pi/2, pi/2), Mˆ =
1√
2
(
i 1
−1 −i
)
, (9)
(the “miracle move”), giving her at least reward r = 3
as pay-off, since $A(Mˆ, Uˆ(θ, 0)) ≥ 3 for any θ ∈ [0, pi],
leaving Bob with $B(Mˆ, Uˆ(θ, 0)) ≤ 1/2 (see Fig. 4 (a)).
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Hence if in an unfair game Alice can be sure that Bob
plays Uˆ(θ, 0), she may choose “Always-Mˆ” as her pre-
ferred strategy in an iterated game. This certainly out-
performs tit-for-tat , but one must keep in mind that the
assumed asymmetry is essential for this argument.
It is moreover interesting to investigate how Alice’s
advantage in an unfair game depends on the degree of
entanglement of the initial state |ψ0〉. The minimal ex-
pected pay-off m Alice can always attain by choosing an
appropriate strategy UA is given by
m = max
UˆA∈S
min
UˆB=Uˆ(θ,0)
$A(UˆA, UˆB); (10)
Alice will not settle for anything less than this quantity.
Considering m a function of the entanglement parame-
ter γ ∈ [0, pi/2] it is clear that m(0) = 1 (since in this
case the dominant strategy Dˆ is the optimal choice) while
for maximal entanglement we find m(pi/2) = 3 which is
achieved by playing Mˆ . Fig. 4 (b) shows m as function
of the entanglement parameter γ. We observe that m is
in fact a monotone increasing function of γ, and the max-
imal advantage is only accessible for maximal entangle-
ment. Furthermore, Alice should deviate from the strat-
egy Dˆ if and only if the degree of entanglement exceeds
a certain threshold value γth = arcsin(1/
√
5) ≈ 0.464.
The observed threshold behavior is in fact reminiscent of
a first order phase transition in Alice’s optimal strategy:
at the threshold she should discontinuously change her
strategy from Dˆ to Qˆ.
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FIG. 4. Quantum versus classical strategies: (a) Alice’s
pay-off as a function of θ when Bob plays Uˆ(θ, 0) (Uˆ(0, 0) = Cˆ
and Uˆ(pi, 0) = Dˆ) and Alice chooses Cˆ (solid line), Dˆ (dots)
or Mˆ (dashes). (b) The expected pay-off Alice can always
attain in an unfair game as a function of the entanglement
parameter γ.
Summarizing we have demonstrated that novel fea-
tures emerge if classical games like the Prisoners’
Dilemma are extended into the quantum domain. We
have introduced a correspondence principle which guar-
antees that the performance of a classical game and its
quantum extension can be compared in an unbiased man-
ner. Very much like in quantum cryptography and com-
putation, we have found superior performance of the
quantum strategies if entanglement is present.
This research was triggered by an inspiring talk of Ar-
tur Ekert on quantum computation. We also acknowl-
edge fruitful discussions with S.M. Barnett, C.H. Ben-
nett, R. Dum, T. Felbinger, P.L. Knight, H.-K. Lo, M.B.
Plenio, A. Sanpera, and P. Zanardi. This work was sup-
ported by the DFG.
[1] J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, The Theory of
Games and Economic Behaviour (Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 1947).
[2] R.B. Myerson, Game Theory: An Analysis of Conflict
(MIT Press, Cambridge, 1991).
[3] R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (Basic Books,
New York, 1984); R. Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1976).
[4] C.H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and
J. Smolin, J. Crypto. 5, 3 (1992).
[5] A.K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[6] N. Gisin and B. Huttner, Phys. Lett. A 228, 13 (1997).
[7] R.F. Werner, Phys. Rev. A 58, 1827 (1998).
[8] D.A. Meyer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 1052 (1999).
[9] L. Goldenberg, L. Vaidman, and S. Wiesner, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 82, 3356 (1999).
[10] Alice’s reasoning goes as follows: “If Bob cooperates my
pay-off will be maximal if and only if I defect. If, on the
other hand, Bob defects, my pay-off will again be maxi-
mal if and only if I defect. Hence I shall defect.”.
[11] The Prisoners’ Dilemma must be distinguished from its
iterated versions where two players play the simple Pris-
oners’ Dilemma several times while keeping track of the
game’s history. In a computer tournament conducted by
Axelrod it was shown that a particular strategy tit-for-tat
outperforms all other strategies [3].
[12] D. Deutsch, Proc. R. Soc. Lond. A 425, 73 (1989).
[13] Probabilistic strategies of this type are called mixed
strategies in game theory.
[14] In a more general treatment one should include the
possibility that each player can resort to any local op-
eration quantum mechanics allows for. That is, each
player may apply any completely positive mapping rep-
resented by operators Ai (Alice) and Bi (Bob), i =
1, 2, ..., respectively, fulfilling the trace-preserving prop-
erties
∑
i
A†
i
Ai = 1,
∑
i
B†
i
Bi = 1. It can then be shown
that with these strategic options the unique Nash equilib-
rium of the main text is replaced by a continuous set and
one isolated Nash equilibrium. This attracts the players’
attention and will make the players expect and therefore
fulfill it (the focal point effect [2]). The focal equilibrium
is the one where Alice maps the initial state J |ψ0〉〈ψ0|J
to 1/4, and Bob chooses the same operation. This pair of
strategies yields an expected pay-off of 2.25 to each player
and is therefore again more efficient than the equilibrium
in dominant strategies in the classical game.
4
